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butes of property. The court further noted 
in its opinion that a professional degree, 
unlike property, cannot be assigned, trans-
ferred, devised, sold, pledged or inherited. 
Other arguments supporting the rejec-
tion of the appellants proposition in-
cluded: 1) the too speculative nature of 
determining the value of a professional 
degree; 2) that an attempt to characterize 
spousal contributions as an investment or 
commercial enterprise deserving compen-
sation demeaned the concept of marriage; 
3) the degree of the spouse is personal and 
represents only the potential for future 
earnings; and 4) that a graduate degree is 
best considered when awarding alimony. 
The court rejected the opinion of a mi-
nority of jurisdictions which hold that 
"the most equitable solution" to compen-
sate one spouse for the sacrifices which 
enabled him/her to pursue a professional 
degree is to allow the supporting spouse 
to "share in the fruits" obtained by the 
other spouse. 
The court in the past has recognized 
that the broad definition of marital prop-
erty includes pension rights. Deering v. 
Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 
(1981). But, the court distinguished a 
spouse's property right to pensions from 
a professional degree. That is, a pension is 
a contractual right to a current asset which 
a spouse has a right to receive. However, 
such rights are plainly distinguishable 
from a professional degree. A professional 
degree is an intellectual attainment per-
sonal to the holder that cannot be sold, 
transferred or inherited. As the court 
stated, a degree/license does not have an 
exchange value; rather, it represents a po-
tential for "earning capacity made pos-
sible ... in combination with innumerable 
other factors too uncertain and speculative 
to constitute marital property." Archer at 
357, 493 A.2d at 1080. 
The court concluded by stating that in 
its award a chancellor should consider the 
circumstances surrounding a spouse's ac-
quisition of a professional degree/license 
as well as that spouse's potential income. 
Income earned by the acquisition of a 
professional degree/license by a spouse 
and the sacrifices of the other spouse in 
helping to attain such a degree are "fac-
tors which may" be considered by the 
court in making an alimony award. The 
court presumed that the trial court con-
sidered these "factors" in determining the 
appellant's amount of alimony ($100 per 
month not to exceed a year). However, 
the court did not consider the adequacy of 
this amount since the appellant did not 
raise that issue on appeal. 
- Gordon Daniels 
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Ake v. Oklahoma: PSYCHIATRISTS 
IN THE COURT ROOM 
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court 
confronted the issue of whether an in-
digent defendant has a constitutional right 
to the psychiatric examination and assis-
tance necessary to prepare an effective de-
fense based on his mental condition. In 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 104 S.Ct. 1087 (1985), 
the Court, speaking through Justice Mar-
shall, held that indigent defendants do, 
under certain circumstances, have a due 
process right to the assistance of a psychi-
atrist in the preparation of their defense. 
The due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment requires a state to provide an 
indigent defendant with access to "com-
petent psychiatric assistance" to aid in the 
preparation of his defense, if the defendant 
makes a preliminary showing that his san-
ity at the time of the crime will be a sig-
nificant factor at trial. Additionally, the 
Court in Ake held that an indigent defen-
dant also has the right to a psychiatrist's 
assistance at a capital sentencing proceed-
ing if the state presents psychiatric evi-
dence as to his future dangerousness. 
The defendant in Ake was charged with 
murdering a husband and wife and wound-
ing their two children. At arraignment, 
the defendant's behavior was so bizarre 
that the trial judge sua sponte ordered him 
to be examined by a psychiatrist. The 
psychiatrist found that the defendant was 
incompetent to stand trial and suggested 
that he be committed. Six weeks later, 
however, the defendant was found to be 
competent provided that he continue to 
be sedated with an antipsychotic drug. 
When the state resumed proceedings 
against the defendant, his attorney, at a 
pretrial conference, informed the court 
that he would raise an insanity defense. 
Therefore, the defense attorney requested 
a psychiatric evaluation, at state expense, 
to determine the defendant's mental state 
at the time of the crime, claiming that the 
defendant was entitled to such an evalua-
tion by the United States Constitution. The 
state court denied the defendant's request 
for such an evaluation. Consequently, 
there was no expert testimony for either 
side on the issue of the defendant's sanity 
at the time of the offense. The jury re-
jected the defendant's insanity defense 
and he was convicted of two counts of 
murder in the first degree and two counts 
of shooting with intent to kill and was 
subsequently sentenced to death. 
In determining whether, and under 
what circumstances, a state should be re-
quired to provide an indigent defendant 
with competent psychiatric assistance in 
preparing his defense, the Court employed 
a three-factor test. The three factors rele-
vant to this determination were (1) "the 
private interest that will be affected by 
the action of the State", (2) "the govern-
mental interest that will be affected if the 
safeguard is to be provided", and (3) "the 
probable value of the additional or sub-
stitute procedural safeguards that are 
sought, and the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of the affected interest if those safe-
guards are not provided." Ake, 104 S.Ct. 
at 1094. The court in Ake, applied this 
three factor test, but considered the first 
two factors only briefly. 
Thus, in considering the first factor, 
the court found that the private interest in 
the accuracy of a criminal proceeding is 
almost uniquely compelling since a crim-
inal proceeding places an individual's life 
or liberty at risk. In considering the sec-
ond factor, the interest of the state, the 
court found that a state's interest in deny-
ing a defendant a psychiatrist's assistance 
was not substantial when balanced against 
the compelling interest of both the state 
and the defendant in the accurate disposi-
tion of a case. In Ake, the state argued 
that a requirement to provide a defendant 
with psychiatric assistance would result 
in a staggering burden. The Court re-
jected the argument that such a require-
ment would place an unbearable economic 
burden on the state, noting that the fed-
eral government and many states currently 
make psychiatric assistance available to 
indigent defendants and they have not 
found the economic burden too great so 
as to preclude psychiatric assistance. Fur-
thermore, the Court argued that this is 
particularly true when the obligation of 
the state is limited to providing only one 
competent psychiatrist. 
In applying the third factor-assessing 
the probable value of psychiatric assis-
tance and the risk of error if it is denied-
the Court determined that, when the state 
makes a defendant's mental condition 
relevant to his criminal culpability and 
subsequent punishment, the assistance of 
a psychiatrist may well be crucial to a 
proper defense. The Court found this 
proposition to be reflected in the fact that 
more than forty states have decided, either 
through legislation or judicial decision, 
that indigent defendants are entitled to 
the assistance of a psychiatrist under cer-
tain circumstances. (It is interesting to 
note that Maryland is not one of these 
forty states.) Additionally, the federal 
government has provided that indigent 
defendants shall receive the assistance of 
all experts "necessary for an adequate de-
fense." Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3006A(e) (1970). Hence, "without the 
assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a 
professional examination on issues rele-
vant to the defense, to help determine 
whether the insanity defense is viable, to 
present testimony, and to assist in prepar-
ing the cross-examination of a State's psy-
chiatric witnesses," the Court concluded 
that "the risk of an inaccurate resolution 
ofinsanity issues is extremely high." Ake, 
104 S.Ct. at 1096. Moreover, the risk of 
error is particularly great when a defen-
dant's mental condition is seriously in 
question. Therefore, the Court decided 
that the need for the assistance of a p~­
chiatrist is readily apparent when a defen-
dant is able to make an ex parte threshold 
showing to the trial court that his sanity is 
likely to be an important factor in his de-
fense. As a result of this finding, the Court 
held that when a defendant demonstrates 
to the trial court that his sanity at the time 
of the offense is to be a significant factor 
at trial, the state "must, at a minimum, as-
sure the defendant access to a competent 
psychiatrist who will conduct an appro-
priate examination and assist in evalua-
tion, preparation, and presentation of the 
defense." Ake, 104 S.Ct. at 1097. The 
Court warns, however, that this does not 
mean that an indigent defendant has a 
constitutional right to choose a psychia-
trist of his personal liking or to receive 
funds to hire his own. Consequently, the 
Court left the determination of how to 
implement this right to the states. 
Finally, the Court held that if a state 
presents psychiatric evidence as to a de-
fendant's future dangerousness, the in-
digent defendant has an additional right 
to a psychiatrist's assistance at the sen-
tencing phase of his trial as well. If this 
were not true, a defendant could not offer 
a well-informed expert's opposing view 
and he would thereby lose an important 
opportunity to raise questions in the 
jurors' minds regarding the state's proof of 
an aggravating factor. Thus, the Court 
decided that at capital sentencing pro-
ceedings, "where the consequence of error 
is so great, the relevance of responsive 
psychiatric testimony so evident, and the 
burden on the state so slim, due process 
requires access to psychiatric examination 
on relevant issues, to the testimony of the 
psychiatrist, and to assistance in prepara-
tion at the sentencing phase." Ake, 104 
S.Ct. at 1097. 
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Ake ar-
guing that the Court's holding should be 
limited to capital cases. Additionally, the 
dissent argued that it should be made 
clear that the entitlement is to an inde-
pendent psychiatric evaluation and not to 
a defense consultant. 
- Jenmfer Hammond 
Evans v. Evans: EXPANDING 
VISITATION RIGHTS 
Earlier this year, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that a trial court is autho-
rized to award visitation rights to the non-
adoptive stepmother of a minor child. 
Evans v. Evans, 302 Md. 334, 488 A.2d 
157 (1985). This decision reversed an un-
published opinion by the Court of Special 
Appeals, and concluded that a 1981 amend-
ment to the statute granting equity courts 
jurisdiction over the custody and visitation 
of a child did not affect well established 
law authorizing the courts great discretion 
to award visitation, provided the best in-
terests of the child are served. 
Appellant and appellee were married in 
June of 1975. For six months prior to the 
marriage, the appellee's son by a previous 
marriage was under the care of the appel-
lant. The parties separated in January of 
1980, but Jason, then six years old, re-
mained under the appellant's care for 
seven months following the separation. In 
August of 1980, Jason went to live with his 
father. The parties filed cross-complaints 
for divorce and the appellant requested 
liberal visitation rights with Jason, which 
were granted by th~ Circuit Court for 
Prince George's County. 
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals 
examined the 1981 amendment to section 
3-602 of the Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Article of the Maryland Code, which 
confers upon the court the authority to 
consider petitions for visitation rights by 
grandparents of a child of divorced parents. 
The Court of Special Appeals concluded 
that the inclusion of this amendment was a 
reflection of the legislature's intent to limit 
the discretionary power of equity courts to 
determine who should be vested with child 
visitation rights. 
The Court of Appeals based its reversal 
on an exhaustive review of the relevant 
statutory and decisional law. It first con-
cluded that the granting of child visitation 
rights within a divorce decree was well 
established in Maryland, citing Prangle v. 
Prangle, 134 Md. 166, 106 A. 337 (1919). 
Although the specific statutory provi-
sions referred only to child "custody" and 
"guardianship," Prangle and subsequent 
decisions interpreted them to implicitly 
encompass visitation rights. See, Hild v. 
Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960); 
Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 145 A. 
614 (1929). Furthermore, the current stat-
utory scheme explicitly grants equity courts 
jurisdiction over child visitation rights. MD. 
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 1-201 (a)(6) 
(1984). 
Secondly, the court traced the history of 
section 3-602, noting that when section 
3-602 was recodified in 1975 it deleted lan-
guage specifying those who could petition 
the court for child custody, (i.e. father, 
mother, relative, next of kin, next friend, 
or any public official). Following these de-
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